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Abstract
Tools for analysing secure information ﬂow are almost exclusively based on ideas going
back to Denning’s work from the 70’s. This approach embodies an imperfect notion of
security which turns a blind eye to information ﬂows which are encoded in the termi-
nation behaviour of a program. In exchange for this weakness many more programs are
deemed ”secure”, using conditions which are easy to check. Previously it was thought
that such leaks are limited to at most one bit per run. Recent work by Askarov et al
(ESORICS’08) offers some bad news and some good news: the bad news is that for
programs which perform output, the amount of information leaked by a Denning style
analysis is not bounded; the good news is that if secrets are chosen to be sufﬁciently
large and sufﬁciently random then they cannot be effectively leaked at all. The prob-
lem addressed in this paper is that secrets cannot always be made sufﬁciently large or
sufﬁciently random. Contrast, for example, an encryption key with an “hasHIV”-ﬁeld
of a patient record. In recognition of this we develop a notion of secret-sensitive non-
interference in which “small” secrets are handled more carefully than “big” ones. We
illustrate the idea with a type system which combines a liberal Denning-style analysis
with a more restrictive system according to the nature of the secrets at hand.1 Introduction
Most tools for analysing information ﬂow in programs such as Jif [MZZ+08] and Flow-
Caml [Sim03] build upon ideas going back to Denning’s work from the 70’s [DD77].
These systems enforce an imperfect notion of information ﬂow which has become
known as termination-insensitive noninterference (TINI). Under this version of non-
interference, information leaks are permitted if they are transmitted purely by the pro-
gram’s termination behaviour (i.e., whether it terminates or not). This imperfection is
the price to pay for having a security condition which is relatively liberal (e.g. allowing
while-loops whose termination may depend on the value of a secret) and easy to check.
How bad is termination-insensitive noninterference? Previously there have been in-
formal arguments that termination-insensitive noninterference leaks at most one bit:
either a program terminates or it does not, so at most one bit of information can be
encoded in the termination state. However, recent work by Askarov et al [AHSS08]
shows that for programs which perform output, an arbitrary amount of information can
be leaked. The following program outputs an ascending sequence of natural numbers
on a public channel until the secret has been output, at which point it goes into a silent
loop:
for i = 0 to maxNat (
output i on public_channel
if (i = secret) then (while true do skip)
)
At the very least we can say that at each output step, the observer is able to narrow
down the possible values of the secret. This program (in suitable variants) is accepted
as secure by state-of-the-art information ﬂow analysis tools such as Jif [MZZ+08],
FlowCaml [Sim03], and the SPARK Examiner [BB03,CH04].
Askarov et al formalise the notion of termination-insensitive noninterference and
showthatalthoughtermination-insensitivenoninterferencecanleakanarbitraryamount
of information, it cannot do so any more efﬁciently than the above example. The revised
intuition for programs performing public output is that the number of possible “termi-
nation states” that can be used to encode information is of the order of the number of
public outputs performed by the program – since the program can diverge after 0 out-
puts, after 1 output, after 2 outputs, etc. This means that to leak n bits of information
the program needs to perform 2n outputs.
For Denning-style analyses this means that if secrets are sufﬁciently large and sufﬁ-
ciently random then programs are computationally secure in the sense that the probabil-
ity of the attacker guessing the secret after observing a polynomial number of outputs
(again, in the size of the secret) gives only a negligible advantage over guessing the
secret without running the program.
What does this mean for information ﬂow analysis in practice? Whereas previously
the imperfections of a Denning-style analysis were viewed as a reasonable tradeoff
between ease of analysis versus degree of security, we believe that in the light of
[AHSS08] we need a different perspective. The leak caused by termination-insensitivity
is only acceptable for sufﬁciently large and random secrets. But secrets, in general, are
not always parametric: one cannot always freely choose to make a secret larger and5
more random. For example, an application cannot decide that a credit card CCV num-
ber should be made larger. An encryption key, on the other hand, might be something
that the application can control, and decide to scale up.
In this paper we consider the information ﬂow problem in an arbitrary multi-level
security lattice. We present a way (Section 2) of reﬁning each security level in an
information-ﬂow lattice into two levels: big secrets, that are sufﬁciently large and ran-
domized to abide some leakage, and small secrets, for which even slow leakage is unac-
ceptable. Then, we deﬁne a two-level noninterference (Section 3), following Askarov et
al’s recent work, which combines the demands of termination-insensitive noninterfer-
ence (for big secrets) with the stricter requirements of termination-sensitive noninterfer-
ence (for small secrets). A type system is provided (Section 4) that ensures this notion
of noninterference. Additional novelties of the system are a somewhat more liberal
treatment of small secrets than found in previous termination-sensitive type systems.
Section 5 describes a strengthening of the deﬁnition of security to eliminate leakage
correlations between big and small secrets.
2 A Reﬁned Multilevel Lattice
In [AHSS08] a deﬁnition of termination-insensitive noninterference (TINI) was intro-
duced which is suitable for programs with outputs, assuming only two security levels
low and high. They proved that, even if programs verifying this condition can leak more
than a bit of information, the attacker cannot reliably (i.e in a single run) learn a secret in
polynomial time in the size of the secret. They also proved that, for programs satisfying
TINI, if secrets are uniformly distributed, then a particular observation of a computation
represents only a negligible hint for the attacker (Theorem 3).
The basic idea in this work is to reﬁne the notion of high into two points bhigh and
shigh. These will correspond to “big” secrets and “small” secrets respectively. We will
deﬁne a notion of secret-sensitive noninterference which allows a low user to learn a
little about big secrets, and nothing at all about small secrets (relative to the notion of
observation that we model).
How are big and small secrets related? A key point here is that data labelled bhigh
will depend only on bhigh or low data sources, whereas data labelled shigh might also
depend on shigh data sources. Thus the label bhigh does not mean that the data is a
large secret – it just means that it does not depend on (contain any information about)
a small secret. We can then see that the resulting reﬁned security lattice is as given in
Figure 1.
Now we generalise this reﬁnement to the case of an arbitrary multi-level lattice
of information levels [Den76]. Denning’s lattice model of information considers an
arbitrary complete lattice  L,⊑L,⊔L,⊓L,⊥L  where L is the set of security clearance
levels (henceforth just levels, ranged over by i, j), and ⊑L is the ordering relation which
determines when one level is higher than another. The idea is that a principal with a
clearance level i is permitted to see data which is classiﬁed at level i or below according
to the partial ordering. Information from any levels may be combined, in which case the
classiﬁcation for the resulting data is given deterministically by the least-upper-bound
operation ⊔L.6
To reﬁne this general case we note that we must split each level i ∈ L, with the
exception of the bottom level ⊥L (which can always be thought of as public data)
into two points, corresponding to the big secrets (labelled b) and the small (labelled
s). Thus any non-bottom element i will be reﬁned to (i,b) and (i,s). To deﬁne the
appropriate order between lattice elements we ﬁrst note that (i,b) ⊑ (i,s) – with the
same motivation as given for the reﬁned two-point lattice. Similarly, when comparing
secrets of the same kind we have (i,a) ⊑ (j,a) only when i ⊑L j.
What about the relationship between two points (i,b)
Fig.1. The reﬁned 2-point
lattice
and(j,s)–whencaninformationﬂowbetweenthesepoints?
The idea is that information at level b is potentially leaked
via a covert channel, so that it may be leaked to any level.
Because of this we can only permit ﬂow from (i,b) to
(j,s), and then only when i ⊑L j. If we permitted a small
secret (i,s) to ﬂow to any (j,b) for (j  = i) then we would
be able to launder small secrets by ﬁrst allowing them to
ﬂow to a big secret and then leaking via the covert channel
from there. In summary, we deﬁne the reﬁnement of a given security lattice:
Deﬁnition 1. Let S denote the 2-point lattice formed from b and s under the ordering
b ⊑ s. We deﬁne the reﬁnement of a security lattice L as the partial product of L
and S, which is the standard product lattice L × S, quotiented by the equivalence
(⊥L,b) ≡ (⊥L,s) – and this bottom element will be simply denoted by ⊥L.
Example Consider the example where L = {secret,financial,medical,public} is
the set of the four security levels a program has to deal with, ordered according to the
HassediagraminFigure2.Motivatingareﬁnementofthelattice,therecouldbemedical
data that is encrypted – or simply very large (e.g. high resolution image data) that could
be safely allowed to leak slowly, and other medical data that are to be handled with
more care, such as an “hasHIV” boolean ﬂag in a patient record. The partial product of
lattices L and S is presented in Figure 3.
Fig.2. Example L Fig.3. The reﬁnement of L
3 Secret-Sensitive Noninterference
In this section we deﬁne the security goal for programs computing over data labelled
with a reﬁned lattice. This variant of the notion of noninterference, secret-sensitive7
noninterference, combines the demands of termination-insensitive noninterference for
b-data, and the stronger termination-sensitive noninterference for s-data. Further, we
develop a bisimulation-style characterisation of secret-sensitive noninterference which
provides a convenient proof method.
Operational Semantics We keep our presentation language independent, but we as-
sume some basic structure for an operational semantics. We will consider simple im-
perative computation modelled by a standard small-step operational semantics deﬁned
over conﬁgurations of the form  M,C  where M is a memory (store) – a ﬁnite mapping
from variables to values – and C (C′, D etc.) is a command. Each variable x is assumed
to have a ﬁxed policy denoted Γ(x), which we take to be a member of the reﬁnement
of some lattice L.
We assume an operational semantics consisting of deterministic labelled transitions
between conﬁgurations, where a label u is either (i) an observable output i(v), meaning
that a value v is output on a channel observable at level i ∈ L or above, or (ii) a silent
action labelled τ. We write e.g.  M,C 
i(v)
→  M′,C′ .
On top of the basic labelled transitions we deﬁne a family of transition systems
labelled by a particular level:
Deﬁnition 2 (i-observable transitions). We can deﬁne the transition relations
u →i, i ∈
L as:
 M,C 
j(v)
→  M′,C′  j ⊑L i
 M,C 
v →i  M′,C′ 
 M,C 
u →  M′,C′  u = τ or u = j(n) where j  ⊑L i
 M,C 
τ →i  M′,C′ 
Thus the i-observable transitions are obtained from the raw transitions by ﬁltering out
(replacing by τ) all output actions that are not visible at level i. Note that the non-
τ transitions are just the value which is observed and not the channel on which it is
observed.
Now we deﬁne the “big step” transitions  M,C 
u ⇒i  M′,C′  as follows
 M,C 
τ ⇒i  M′,C′  ,  M,C 
τ →
∗
i  M′,C′ 
 M,C 
v ⇒i  M′,C′  ,  M,C 
τ →
∗
i
v →i M′,C′ 
We also deﬁne the multi-step observations  M,C 
  v ⇒i  M′,C′  with   v = v1v2    vn
as follows:
 M,C 
v1 ⇒i  M1,C1 
v2 ⇒i  M2,C2 
v3 ⇒i    
vn−1 ⇒ i  Mn−1,Cn−1 
vn ⇒i  M′,C′ 
for some sequence of intermediate conﬁgurations  Mi,Ci . We deﬁne the multi-step
reduction for the empty vector to be synonymous with
τ ⇒i.8
Attacker’s knowledge Our presentation follows the style of Askarov et al [AHSS08]
closely. The deﬁnition of noninterference developed here builds on the concept of at-
tacker knowledge which is what an attacker (an observer of a given clearance level i)
can deduce about the initial values of variables based on a particular observation of a
program run.
The attacker i knows the initial low part of the memory. The low part of the memory
from the perspective of a given level i is all variables with policy (i,s) or lower - and
observes some output trace   v that is not necessarily maximal, knows the program and
is able to make perfect deductions about the semantics of the program. For a memory
M we let Mi denote the low part of the memory from the perspective of an observer at
level i, i.e. the part of the memory that he can see.
Deﬁnition 3 (Observations).GivenaprogramC andalowmemoryMi,thei-observa-
tions is the set of all possible sequences of observable outputs that could arise from a
run of C with a memory compatible with Mi. It is deﬁned:
Obsi(C,Mi) = {  v| N,C 
  v ⇒i  N′,C′ , Ni = Mi}
Deﬁnition 4 (Attacker’s knowledge). Given a program C, an initial choice Mi of the
low part of the memory (for level i) and a trace of i-observable outputs  v, the attacker’s
knowledge gained from this observation is the set of all possible memories that could
have lead to this observation.
ki(C,Mi,  v) = {N| N,C 
  v ⇒i  N′,C′ , Ni = Mi}
Note that increase in knowledge corresponds to a decrease in the size of the knowledge
set. Knowledge increases with outputs: the more outputs the attacker observes, the more
precise is his knowledge [AS07]:
∀C,Mi,  v,v. ki(C,Mi,  vv) ⊆ ki(C,Mi,  v)
In order to distinguish between what is learnt about the “big” secrets (variables at levels
(i,b)) from what is learnt about the “small secrets” (variables at levels (i,s)) we deﬁne
the projections of knowledge sets to the b- and s-parts.
Deﬁnition 5 (b- and s-restricted memories). Given a memory M, and a security
size a ∈ S, we deﬁne M|i
a to be the restriction of M to those variables x such that
Γ(x) = (j,a), j  ⊑ i – i.e. the ”a-secrets” from i’s perspective. We extend the deﬁnition
pointwise to sets of memories.
Deﬁnition 6 (b- and s-restricted knowledge). Given a program C, a security size a ∈
S and an initial choice Mi of the low part of the memory and a trace of outputs  v, the a-
restricted knowledge of the attacker i, written ka
i (C,Mi,  v) is deﬁned (ki(C,Mi,  v))|i
a.
Informally, the restricted knowledge ka
i (C,Mi,  v) is i’s knowledge about the a-secrets
(from i’s perspective) after having observed   v from initial memory Mi.
The idea of “i’s secrets” can be illustrated using the lattice presented in Figure 3.
For example, the projection M|ﬁnance
s restricts M to just those variables with classiﬁ-
cations (medical,s) or (secret,s). The ﬁnance-perspective on the lattice is illustrated9
Fig.4. The ﬁnance-perspective on the example reﬁned lattice
in Figure 4, where the b-secrets and s-secrets are marked. The low part of the lattice,
from the ﬁnance perspective, is also marked.
The s-restricted knowledge for an attacker at level ﬁnance is thus the knowledge
that can be deduced about the s-secret part of the memory.
Noninterference Several kinds of noninterference can be deﬁned from the notion of
knowledge. Here we adapt the deﬁnition of termination-(in)sensitive noninterference
that was proposed in [AHSS08] and then propose a deﬁnition of a two-levelled nonin-
terference.
Deﬁnition 7 (Termination-Sensitive Noninterference (TSNI)). A program C satis-
ﬁes TSNI if for all i, whenever   vv ∈ Obsi(C,Mi) then
ki(C,Mi,  v) = ki(C,Mi,  vv).
TSNI means that at each step of output, nothing new about the high memory is learnt
by the attacker.
Deﬁnition 8 (Termination-Insensitive Noninterference (TINI)). A program C satis-
ﬁes TINI if for all i, whenever   vv ∈ Obsi(C,Mi) then
ki(C,Mi,  vv) =
[
v′
ki(C,Mi,  vv′).
TINI allows leakage at each low output step, but only through the fact that there is some
output step. The knowledge leaked by one output is the same as for any other.
In order to deal with our two different kinds of secret (b and s), the idea is here to
combine both TSNI and TINI: although we only accept TSNI for s-data which must be
handled with more care, we allow TINI for b-data, that abide some leakage since they
are randomized and large enough.
Deﬁnition 9 (Secret-Sensitive Noninterference (SSNI)). A program C satisﬁes SSNI
if for all i, whenever   vv ∈ Obsi(C,Mi) then the following two properties hold:
ks
i(C,Mi,  vv) = ks
i(C,Mi,  v) (s-TSNI)
kb
i(C,Mi,  vv) =
S
v′ kb
i(C,Mi,  vv′) (b-TINI)10
3.1 Characterising SSNI
The knowledge based deﬁnitions are (in our opinion) lucid because they give a clear
attacker perspective on the problem. However, for reasoning about secret-sensitive non-
interference we ﬁnd it convenient to work with a more conventional characterisation in
terms of bisimulation relations. Here we develop this alternative characterisation, which
we will employ in Section 4 in order to prove that the type system there guarantees
secret-sensitive noninterference.
The basic idea is to establish the two components of SSNI via two forms of bisim-
ulation relations between conﬁgurations.
Deﬁnition 10 (Termination-sensitive i-bisimulation (i-TSB)). A symmetric relation
R on conﬁgurations is a termination-sensitive i-bisimulation, if  M,C R N,D  im-
plies:
(i) Mi = Ni and M|i
b = N|i
b, and
(ii) whenever M,C 
u →i  M′,C′ then N,D 
u ⇒i  N′,D′ with M′,C′ R N′,D′ .
Two conﬁgurations are said to be i-TSB equivalent (denoted by ∼ =i) if there exists a
i-TSB relating them.
Here, the termination-sensitivity comes from the ability to produce the next output to-
gether with the symmetry of the relation.
Deﬁnition 11 (Termination-insensitive i-bisimulation (i-TIB)). We say that a con-
ﬁguration  M,C  diverges for i, written  M,C ⇑i, if  M,C  cannot perform any i-
observable output transition
v →i.
A symmetric relation R on conﬁgurations is deﬁned to be a termination-insensitive
i-bisimulation if whenever  M,C R N,D  we have
(i) Mi = Ni and
(ii) if  M,C 
u →i  M′,C′  then either  N,D 
u ⇒i  N′,D′  with  M′,C′ R N′,D′ ,
or  N,D ⇑i.
Two conﬁgurations are said to be i-TIB equivalent (denoted by ≃i) if there exists a
i-TIB relating them.
Notethatthenotionof“divergence”usedhereispurelyfromtheperspectiveofaremote
observer who sees only the outputs on channels. We could make this more conventional
if we made program termination an observable event for all levels. We have chosen not
to do so, but the technical development in this paper does not depend in a crucial way
on this fact.
Before we show these relations in Deﬁnitions 10 and 11 are sufﬁcient tocharacterise
SSNI, we need the following lemmas about i-TSB and i-TIB.
Lemma 1.
If  M,C  ∼ =i  N,D  and  M,C 
  v ⇒i  M′,C′  then  N,D 
  v ⇒i  N′,D′  with
 M′,C′  ∼ =i  N′,D′ .11
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of outputs (length of  v), and in the base
case by induction on the length of the raw transition sequence.
– Base case:   v has length 0 so every transition is silent. We proceed by induction on
the number n of silent steps:
• Base case: trivial for n = 0.
• Induction: here, we have the following n + 1-step computation  M,C 
τ →i
 M2,C2 
τ →i ... Mn,Cn 
τ →i  Mn+1,Cn+1  =  M′,C′ . Applying the in-
duction hypothesis on the n ﬁrst steps, we have that  N,D 
τ ⇒i  Nm,Dm 
with  Mn,Cn  ∼ =i  Nm,Dm . But  Mn,Cn 
τ →i  Mn+1,Cn+1 , so by deﬁni-
tion of an i-TSB, we have that  Nm,Dm 
τ ⇒  N′,D′  with  Mn+1,Cn+1  ∼ =i
 N′,D′ .Weconcludeconcatenatingcomputations: N,D 
τ ⇒i  Nm,Dm 
τ ⇒
 N′,D′ .
– Induction: suppose   v has length k + 1. This can be written
 M,C 
v1...vk = = = = ⇒i  Mnk,Cnk 
vk+1 = = = ⇒i  Mnk+1,Cnk+1 . Applying the induction hy-
pothesis on the k ﬁrst output multisteps, we obtain
 N,D 
v1...vk = = = = ⇒i  Nmk,Dmk  with  Mnk,Cnk  ∼ =i  Nmk,Dmk .
But  Mnk,Cnk  makes an output multistep
vk+1 = = = ⇒i. We conclude applying the deﬁ-
nition of an i-TSB as many times as there are silent steps before vk+1 is output. 2
Lemma 2.
If  M,C  ≃i  N,D  and  M,C 
  v ⇒i  M′,C′  then  N,D 
  v′
⇒i  N′,D′  for some   v′
such that either  v =   v′ and  M′,C′  ≃i  N′,D′ , or   v′ is a preﬁx of  v and  N′,D′ ⇑i.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 1. 2
The following propositions state that SSNI can be couched in the bisimulation set-
ting. To symplify notations, we will denote by L,L′...the low projections Mi of a
memory M from the perspective of i, when i is clear from the context. Similarly, we
will respectively denote by B,B′...and S,S′...the restrictions M|i
b and M|i
s. The triple
LBS will denote the necessarily unique memory M such that Mi = L, M|i
b = B and
M|i
s = S.
Proposition 1.
Suppose that for all levels i and all memories M and N such that Mi = Ni and
M|i
b = N|i
b we have  M,C  ∼ =i  N,C . Then for all i, whenever   vv ∈ Obsi(C,Mi)
then ks
i(C,Mi,  vv) = ks
i(C,Mi,  v).
Proof. Here we just focus on the inclusion ⊇, since ⊆ comes from the monotonicity of
knowledge.
Suppose  vv ∈ Obsi(C,L)andforallL,B,S andS′ wehave LBS,C  ∼ =i  LBS′,C .
Let S0 be an element of ks
i(C,L,  v). We have to show that S0 ∈ ks
i(C,L,  vv) (nothing
is learned from the output v).
Since   vv ∈ Obsi(C,L), there exist B,S such that  LBS,C 
  vv ⇒i  L′B′S′,C′ .
But we also have  LBS,C  ∼ =i  LBS0,C . Thanks to Lemma 1 we then have that
 LBS0,C 
  vv ⇒i  L′′B′′S′
0,C′′ , which means that S0 ∈ ks
i(C,L,  vv).
212
Proposition 2.
Suppose that for all levels i and all M, N such that Mi = Ni we have that  M,C  ≃i
 N,C . Then   vv ∈ Obsi(C,Mi) implies kb
i(C,Mi,  vv) =
S
v′ kb
i(C,Mi,  vv′).
Proof. Let i ∈ L. Suppose   vv ∈ Obsi(C,L). Then,  LBS,C 
  vv ⇒i  L2B2S2,C2 . We
decomposethiscomputationasfollows: LBS,C 
  v ⇒i  L1B1S1,C1 
v ⇒i  L2B2S2,C2 .
Letv′ andB0 suchthatB0 ∈ kb
i(C,L,  vv′).WehavetoshowthatB0 ∈ kb
i(C,L,  vv)
(what is learned from v is the same as from the output v′).
SinceB0 isinkb
i(C,L,  vv′),wehave LB0S0,C 
  v ⇒i  L′B′
0S′
0,C′ 
v
′
⇒i  L′′B′′
0S′′
0,C′′ 
for some S0.
By hypothesis, we have that  LBS,C  ≃i  LB0S0,C .
Thanks to Lemma 2, we have that  L1B1S1,C1  ≃i  L′B′
0S′
0,C′ . By deﬁnition
of a i-TIB, because C′ does not diverge starting from L′B′
0S′
0 (since  L′B′
0S′
0,C′ 
v
′
⇒i
 L′′B′′
0S′′
0,C′′ ), then the output value is the same : v = v′.
So,  L0B0S0,C 
  v ⇒i  L′B′
0S′
0,C′ 
v ⇒i  L′′B′′
0S′′
0,C′′ , which means that B0 ∈
kb
i(C,L,  vv).
2
Clearly, then, putting the propositions together we get a proof technique for SSNI:
Corollary 1. C satisﬁes SSNI if, for all levels i and all M, and N we have
• Mi = Ni implies  M,C  ≃i  N,C , and
• Mi = Ni and M|i
b = N|i
b implies  M,C  ∼ =i  N,C .
3.2 Computational Security
Deﬁnition 9 clearly enforces termination-sensitive noninterference for s-data. Regard-
ing b-data, we can provide the computational security guarantees of [AHSS08] to show
that b-secrets, if chosen uniformly, cannot be leaked in polynomial time in their size. To
argue this we can ﬁrst reclassify all secrets as b-data (or equivalently assume that there
are no s-secrets). Then we are back in the standard security lattice, and we simply need
to generalise the results of [AHSS08] from a two-point lattice to an arbitrary one. This
is, as usual, unproblematic since from the perspective of each individual level i there
are only two levels of interest: the levels which can be seen (i.e. the levels less than or
equal to i) and those which cannot. The main result is that if b-data is randomly chosen,
then an observer at level i learns a negligible amount of information (as a function of
the size of the b-data) about the data which i cannot see. We will not further develop the
details of this argument in the present article. The differences from the development in
[AHSS08] would be minor.13
4 Secret-Sensitive Noninterference by Typing
In this section, we describe a type system that enforces the noninterference Deﬁnition 9:
well-typed programs are secret-sensitive noninterfering. We study a classical determin-
istic while programming language deﬁned with expressions and commands.
e ::= n | x | e op e
c ::= skip | x := e | c ; c | if e then c else c |
while e do c | for e do c | outputi(e)
Here n stands for any integer constant, x for any variable and op for any of the classical
binary arithmetical operators. Booleans are represented by integers the classical way
(0 is false, and everything else is true). We also assume that there are no exceptions
raised: all binary operators are totally deﬁned.
Note that the language provides two types of loops: for loops are always termi-
nating, that is the guard expression is evaluated just once, leading to a constant that is
decreased each time the end of the loop body is reached, and while loops are potentially
non terminating. The distinction will be used in the type system to good effect.
The language includes the outputi primitive method that writes the value of its
argument to a channel with level i. The operational semantics is standard and is given
in Figure 5. We denote by M(x) the value of the variable x.
4.1 Type system
This type system is based on the combination of a standard Denning-style analysis
(in type system form [VSI96]) for enforcing the termination-insensitive security for b-
secrets, and a more restrictive type system for handling the s-secrets. One such termina-
tion-sensitive type system is that described in [VS97], but that system is extremely
restrictive: loops are only allowed if the guard does not refer to anything except data
at the lowest lattice level, and if there is a branch on secret data at any level then no
loops are allowed inside the branches. Instead we adapt an idea common to the type
systems from [BC01] and [Smi01] for the termination-sensitive part. The idea is here
to allow high while loops (i.e. loops with high guards or arbitrary while loops occurring
in a high context) so long as no assignment or output to levels below the loop guards
follows them.
The form of the typing judgements follows the style of [BC01] in that it handles
indirect information ﬂows by recording the write effect of a command (the lowest level
to which it writes data). This gives the same power as Denning’s popular approach
which uses a “program counter” level.
Consider both lattices L and S, and let P be their partial product as previously
deﬁned. A type is either an expression type denoted e : τ, or a command type writ-
ten (τ,σ,δ)cmd, where both τ and σ are in P, the set of security levels, and δ, the
termination ﬂag is a member of the set {↓,↑}, where we order the elements ↓ ≤ ↑.
Type judgments are of the form
Γ ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd14
 M,n  ⇓ n
E-CONST
M(x) = n
 M,x  ⇓ n
E-VAR
 M,e1  ⇓ n1  M,e2  ⇓ n2 n1 op n2 = n
 M,e1 op e2  ⇓ n
E-BINOP
 M,e  ⇓ n
 M,outputi(e) 
i(n)
→  M,skip 
C-OUT
 M,e  ⇓ n
 M,x:=e 
τ →  M[x ← n],skip 
C-ASSIGN
 M,C1 
u →  M
′,C
′
1 
 M,C1;C2 
u →  M′,C′
1;C2 
C-SEQ1
 M,skip;C2 
τ →  M,C2 
C-SEQ2
 M,e  ⇓ n n  = 0
 M,if e then C1 else C2 
τ →  M,C1 
C-IF1
 M,e  ⇓ 0
 M,if e then C1 else C2 
τ →  M,C2 
C-IF2
 M,while e do C 
τ →  M,if e then (C;while e do C) else skip 
C-WHILE
 M,e  ⇓ n n1 = |n|
 M,for e do C 
τ →  M,if n1 then (C;for n1 − 1 do C) else skip 
C-FOR
Fig.5. The labelled transition system
where Γ is the typing environment i.e. a mapping from variables to variable types. In
the following, Γ is kept implicit. The syntactic meaning of such a judgment is that
– τ is a lower bound on the security levels of variables that are assigned to in C.
– σ is the least upper bound on the levels of (for, if, while) guards occurring in C.
– δ is ↓ if C contains no while loops, and is ↑ otherwise.
The semantic implication of these typings is that
– τ is a lower bound on the the write effect of the command – i.e., the command only
modiﬁes variables of level τ or above, and
– σ is the termination effect: observing that C produces some output (i.e. “termi-
nates”) give us knowledge about data at level at most σ.
– δ is a termination ﬂag: if δ = ↓ then the command always terminates.
With these intended meanings of τ, σ and δ, there is a natural partial order on types
which is contravariant in the ﬁrst component and covariant in the second and third:
(τ,σ,δ)cmd ≤ (τ′,σ′,δ′)cmd if τ′ ⊑P τ and σ ⊑P σ′ and δ ≤ δ′
This relation is not used in the type system, but is used in the statement of e.g. the
subject reduction property below.15
For elements of P (the ﬁrst two components of a command type in particular) we
deﬁne the ﬁrst and second projections in the obvious way: fst(i,a) = i and fst(⊥P) =
⊥L; snd(i,a) = a and snd(⊥P) = ⊥S = b.
Rules of the security type system are displayed in Figure 6, where we drop the
subscript for the relation ⊑P.
Explicit ﬂows are handled with rules for expressions, rules T-ASSIGN, and T-
OUT, while implicit ﬂows are treated in T-IF, T-WHILE and T-FOR which demand
that their body is at least as high as their guard level.
Most of the action takes place in the sequential composition rules. The interesting
case is T-SEQ2 where the termination effect σ1 of C1 is an s-secret, and C1 is indeed
potentially nonterminating. This means that we cannot allow arbitrary assignments in
C2 since these might leak information about the s-secrets which affected the termina-
tion of C1. Thus the write effect of C2 is constrained so that it does not write below
σ1, the termination effect of C1. For rule T-SEQ1 we are more liberal, since either the
guards do not depend on s-secrets, or C1 is always terminating.
The same reasoning is applied to while and for loops – their execution may be a
sequential composition of the body of the loop and the loop itself.
⊢ n : τ
T-CONST
Γ(x) = τ var
⊢ x : τ
T-VAREXP
⊢ e : τ
′ τ
′ ⊑ τ
⊢ e : τ
T-SUBEXP
⊢ e1 : τ ⊢ e2 : τ
⊢ e1 op e2 : τ
T-BINOP
⊢ skip : (⊤P,⊥P,↓)cmd
T-SKIP
⊢ e : τ Γ(x) = τ var
⊢ x := e : (τ,⊥P,↓)cmd
T-ASSIGN
⊢ e : τ fst(τ) ⊑L i
⊢ outputi(e) : ((i,s),⊥P,↓)cmd
T-OUT
⊢ Ci : (τi,σi,δi)cmd snd(σ1) = b or δ1 = ↓
⊢ C1;C2 : (τ1 ⊓ τ2,σ1 ⊔ σ2,δ1 ⊔ δ2)cmd
T-SEQ1
⊢ Ci : (τi,σi,δi)cmd σ1 ⊑ τ2 snd(σ1) = s δ1 = ↑
⊢ C1;C2 : (τ1 ⊓ τ2,σ1 ⊔ σ2,↑)cmd
T-SEQ2
⊢ e : θ ⊢ Ci : (τi,σi,δi)cmd θ ⊑ τi
⊢ if e then C1 else C2 : (τ1 ⊓ τ2,σ1 ⊔ σ2 ⊔ θ,δ1 ⊔ δ2)cmd
T-IF
⊢ e : θ ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd θ ⊑ τ snd(σ) = s ⇒ σ ⊑ τ
⊢ while e do C : (τ,σ ⊔ θ,↑)cmd
T-WHILE
⊢ e : θ ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd θ ⊑ τ snd(σ) = s ∧ δ = ↑ ⇒ σ ⊑ τ
⊢ for e do C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd
T-FOR
Fig.6. The security type system16
4.2 Type Soundness
In this section we prove some results about well typed programs with regard to the
type system in Figure 6. The main proposition establishes that the type system indeed
enforces the secret-sensitive noninterference property we deﬁned in Section 3.
The ﬁrst property is the standard notion of subject reduction which guarantees that
execution preserves types.
Theorem 1 (Subject reduction). If ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd and  M,C 
u →  M′,C′ , then
⊢ C′ : (τ′,σ′,δ′)cmd with (τ′,σ′,δ′)cmd ≤ (τ,σ,δ)cmd.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the type derivation, and then by case analysis on
the last rule of operational semantics.
– T-ASSIGN: Here, ⊢ x := e : (τ,⊥p,↓)cmd. On every memory M,  M,x :=
e 
τ → M′,skip . By T-SKIP, ⊢ skip : (⊤P,⊥P,↓)cmd. And (⊤P,⊥P,↓)cmd ≤
(τ,⊥p,↓)cmd, because τ ⊑P ⊤P for every τ.
– T-OUT: Here, ⊢ outputi(e) : ((i,s),⊥p,↓)cmd. On every memory M, we have
 M,outputi(e) 
τ →  M,skip . By T-SKIP, ⊢ skip : (⊤P,⊥P,↓)cmd. And
(⊤P,⊥P,↓)cmd ≤ ((i,s),⊥p,↓)cmd, because (i,s) ⊑P ⊤P for every i.
– T-SEQ1: Here,⊢ C1;C2 : (τ1 ⊓ τ2,σ1 ⊔ σ2,δ1 ⊔ δ2 because ⊢ Ci : (τi,σi,δi)cmd
and snd(σ1) ⊑S b or δ1 = ↓.
We distinguish two cases according to whether C-SEQ1 or C-SEQ2 is used to make
a step.
• C-SEQ1: Here,  M,C1;C2 
u →  M′,C′
1;C2  because  M,C1 
u →  M′,C′
1 .
Applying induction hypothesis on C1, we get : ⊢ C′
1 : (τ′
1,σ′
1,δ′
1)cmd with
(τ′
1,σ′
1,δ′
1)cmd ≤ (τ1,σ1,δ1)cmd. Moreover, snd(σ′
1) ⊑ b or δ′
1 = ↓.
Now, applying rule T-SEQ1 on C′
1 and C2, we get : ⊢ C′
1;C2 : (τ′
1 ⊓ τ2,σ′
1 ⊔
σ2,δ′
1 ⊔ δ2)cmd. Now we can conclude :
∗ We have τ1 ⊓ τ2 ⊑ τ′
1 ⊓ τ2. By case analysis, because τ1 ⊑ τ′
1.
∗ We have σ′
1 ⊓ σ2 ⊑ σ1 ⊓ σ2 because σ′
1 ⊑ σ1.
∗ Finally,δ′
1 ⊔ δ2 ⊑ δ1 ⊔ δ2 because δ′
1 ≤ δ1.
• C-SEQ2: Here, C1 is skip and  M,skip;C2 
τ →  M,C2 . We have ⊢ C2 :
(τ2,σ2,δ2)cmd, and we can conclude since :
∗ τ1 ⊓ τ2 ⊑ τ2
∗ σ2 ⊑ σ1 ⊔ σ2
∗ δ2 ⊑ δ1 ⊔ δ2
– T-SEQ2: Here, ⊢ C1;C2 : (τ1 ⊓ τ2,σ1 ⊔ σ2,↑)cmd because ⊢ Ci : (τi,σi,δi)cmd
an σ1 ⊑ τ2 and snd(σ1) = s δ1 = ↑. Only rule C-SEQ1 can be used, since δ1 = ↑.
Thus,  M,C1;C2 
u →  M′,C′
1;C2  because  M,C1 
u →  M′,C′
1 . Applying in-
duction hypothesis on C1, we get : ⊢ C′
1 : (τ′
1,σ′
1,δ′
1)cmd with (τ′
1,σ′
1,δ′
1)cmd ≤
(τ1,σ1,δ1)cmd.
We distinguish two cases :
• If δ′
1 = ↓, then we can apply T-SEQ1, obtaining ⊢ C′
1;C2 : (τ′
1 ⊓ τ2,σ′
1 ⊔
σ2,δ′
1 ⊔ δ2)cmd. We again conclude by a case analysis as previously.17
• Ifδ′
1 = ↑,thenwecanapplyT-SEQ2because σ′
1 ⊑ σ1 ⊑ τ2.Weget⊢ C′
1;C2 :
(τ′
1 ⊓ τ2,σ′
1 ⊔ σ2,↑)cmd and conclude as previously.
– T-IF: Here, ⊢ if e then C1 else C2 : (τ1 ⊓ τ2,σ1 ⊔ σ2 ⊔ θ,δ1 ⊔ δ2)cmd because
⊢ e : θ and ⊢ Ci : (τi,σi,δi)cmd and θ ⊑ τi.
Depending on whether C-IF1 or C-IF2 is used, there are two cases :
• If C-IF1 is used, C1 will be the next instruction, then we have to show that
(τ1,σ1,δ1)cmd ≤ (τ1 ⊓ τ2,σ1 ⊔ σ2 ⊔ θ,δ1 ⊔ δ2)cmd. We proceed simply by
deﬁnition of ⊓ and ⊔.
• Similarly if C-IF2 is used.
– T-FOR: Here ⊢ for e do C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd because ⊢ e : θ, ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd,
θ ⊑ τ and snd(σ) = s ∧ δ = ↑ ⇒ σ ⊑ τ.
According to C-FOR, we have to type if n1 then C;for n1 − 1 do C else skip
where  M,e  ⇓ n and n1 = |n|. But ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd and ⊢ for n1 − 1 do C :
(τ,σ,δ)cmd.
There are two cases to type the sequential composition :
• If δ = ↓, then we use rule C-SEQ1 to get : ⊢ C;for n1−1 do C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd.
We conclude using T-IF with : ⊢ if n1 then C;for n1 − 1 do C else skip :
(τ,σ,δ)cmd (because ⊢ n1 : ⊥P).
• If δ = ↑, then we can use T-SEQ2 : in fact σ ⊑ τ by the side condition of
T-FOR because snd(σ) = s (otherwise, we would use T-SEQ1) and δ = ↑.
We get : ⊢ C;for n1 − 1 do C : (τ,σ,↑)cmd. We conclude using T-IF rule,
obtaining : ⊢ if n1 then C;for n1 − 1 do C else skip : (τ,σ,δ)cmd.
– T-WHILE: Here ⊢ while e do C : (τ,σ ⊔ θ,↑)cmd because ⊢ e : θ, ⊢ C :
(τ,σ,δ)cmd, θ ⊑ τ and snd(σ) = s ⇒ σ ⊑ τ. According to C-WHILE, we
have to type if e then (C;while e do C) else skip. But ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd and
⊢ while e do C : (τ,σ ⊔ θ,↑)cmd.
We have two cases for typing C;while e do C.
• If snd(σ) ⊑P b, we can use rule T-SEQ1. Thus, ⊢ C;while e do C : (τ,σ ⊔
θ,↑)cmd. Using rule T-IF, we get : ⊢ if e then (C;while e do C) else skip :
(τ,σ ⊔ θ,↑)cmd.
• If snd(σ) = s then, by the side condition of T-WHILE, we have σ ⊑ τ.
Applying T-SEQ2, we get : ⊢ C;while e do C : (τ,σ⊔θ,↑)cmd. By rule T-IF,
we conclude with : ⊢ if e then (C;while e do C) else skip : (τ,σ ⊔ θ,↑)cmd.
2
The following lemmas (using the terminology from [VSI96]) conﬁrm that the infor-
mal deﬁnitions we gave about both components of a command type in Section 4.1 are
enforced by the type system.
Lemma 3 (Simple security). If ⊢ e : τ then every variable occurring in e has type
τ′ var where τ′ ⊑ τ.
Lemma 4 (Conﬁnement). If ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd, then every variable assigned to in
program C has type θ var with τ ⊑ θ.18
Lemma 5 (Guard safety). If ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd, then every while loop or conditional
guard in program C has type θ var with θ ⊑ σ.
Lemma 6 (Termination). If ⊢ C : (τ,σ,↓)cmd, then C terminates on all memories.
The proofs of these four lemmas are straightforward inductions on the respective typing
derivations; the details are omitted.
Inthe formaldevelopment thatfollowsforsimplicity’ssake we only treatthecase of
the three point lattice in Figure 1. The following results can be extended to the general
case: for a given clearance level i in L, as was depicted in the example of ﬁnance’s
perspective in Figure 4, the reﬁnement of L can be rethought of as a three point lattice
- low level, bhigh and shigh secrets.
Recall that the three point lattice is the partial product of {low,high} and S, which
yields the three ordered points low ⊑P (high,b) ⊑P (high,s). In the following we
write bhigh and shigh for the latter two points. A command C is said to be shigh or
bhigh if there exists τ and σ such that ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd with respectively τ = shigh
or bhigh ⊑ τ.
Inordertofurtherlightenthenotation,weﬁrstintroducethenotionofa-equivalence
on memories, for each a in the three point-lattice, as follows:
Deﬁnition 12 (Memory a-equivalence).
Let a be in {low,bhigh,shigh}. Two memories M and N are said to be a-equivalent,
denoted by M =a N if for all variables x, Γ(x) ⊑ a ⇒ M(x) = N(x).
The goal in the type soundness proof is to build for each i a i-TSB and i-TIB over
conﬁgurations of the form  M,C  and  N,C , where C is typeable. The following two
propositions identify classes of conﬁgurations that can be easily shown to be bisimilar.
Proposition 3 (l-TSBisimilarity of shigh commands).
The relation {( M,C , N,D )|M =b N;C,D are shigh} is a l-TSB.
Proof. The relation is symmetric by deﬁnition. Let C and D be two shigh commands,
and M, N be two memories such that M =b N, so we have that M =l N. Suppose
we have  M,C 
u →l  M′,C′ . Since C is shigh, then the transition is silent, hence
we can match the step by  N,D 
τ ⇒l  N,D . The two resulting conﬁgurations stay in
the relation, because shigh-ness is preserved along the execution of C (Lemma 1), and
M′ =b N because M′ =b M (by Lemma 4 and shigh-ness of C).
2
Proposition 4 (l-TIBisimilarity of bhigh commands).
The relation deﬁned :{( M,C , N,D )|M =l N;C,D bhigh} is a l-TIB.
Proof. Similar to Proposition 3, by matching with the empty transition. 2
We also need the following lemma that states the l or b-equivalence of memories
is preserved along the execution of a typeable command depending on its termination
effect σ.19
Lemma 7.
If ⊢ C : (τ,low,δ)cmd and M =l N then  M,C 
u →l  M′,C′  implies  N,C 
u →l
 N′,C′  with M′ =l N′.
If ⊢ C : (τ,bhigh,δ)cmd and M =b N then  M,C 
u →l  M′,C′  implies
 N,C 
u →l  N′,C′  with M′ =b N′.
Proof. By induction on the type derivation ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd. We only prove the ﬁrst
part, the other one is similar.
– C = x := e and ⊢ e : τ with Γ(x) = τ. Then, C′ = skip. If τ = low then
by Lemma 3 the variables in e must all be low, and hence evaluating e in M or N
yields the same value so the resulting memories stay low-equivalent. Otherwise, if
τ  = low then x cannot be a low variable and thus low-equivalence of memories is
trivially preserved by this command.
– C = outputi(e). If i = low then, the same value is output during the computation
step. Now if i is greater, then this is a silent transition on M and N. Here, memories
are not modiﬁed and stay trivially low-equivalent.
– C = C1;C2. Only rule T-SEQ1 can be used, so ⊢ C1 : (τ1,σ1,δ1)cmd and
⊢ C2 : (τ2,σ2,δ2)cmd with σ1 = σ2 = low. If the transition is taken by mean of
rule C-SEQ1, then C′ = C′
1;C2 with  M,C1 
u →l  M′,C′
1 . Induction hypothesis
on C1 gives that  N,C1 
u →l  N′,C′
1  with M′ =l N′. We conclude by applying
rule C-SEQ1 on this transition.
Now if rule C-SEQ2 is used, then C1 = skip and there is no output. We again
apply induction hypothesis on C2 and rule C-SEQ2.
– C = if e then C1 else C2. Here, we have that ⊢ e : l. But M =l N so the same
branch is executed starting either from M or N, in a silent transition. Memories are
not modiﬁed and hence stay low-equivalent.
– C = while e do D and C = for e do D. Same as conditional.
2
Now we can state the main result.
Proposition 5 (Noninterference of well typed commands).
If a command C is typable, i.e., ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd, then C satisﬁes SSNI.
Proof. We use the proof technique provided by Corollary 1. The ﬁrst step is to show
that ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd implies  C,M  ∼ =i  C,N  for all levels i, to have the s-TSNI
property of Deﬁnition 9.
The case i = high is vacuous: memories and commands are in this case equal. The
interesting case is i = low.
We show that ⊢ C : (τ,σ,δ)cmd implies  C,M  ∼ =l  C,N  for all M and N that
are equal on their low and bhigh parts, deﬁning a relation R1:  M,C R1 N,D  if and
only if C and D are typable, Ml = Nl and M|l
b = N|l
b , and one of the following
holds:
(i) C and D are shigh20
(ii) C = D
(iii) C = C1;C2, D = D1;C2 with  M,C1 R1 N,D1  and C2 is shigh
(iv) C is shigh, D = D1;D2 with  M,skip R1 N,D1  and D2 is shigh
We have to show that R1 is a l-TSB. Suppose we have  M,C R1 N,D . By deﬁ-
nition of R1, we have that M =l N. Now we have to show that if  M,C 
u →l  M′,C′ 
then  N,D 
u ⇒l  N′,D′  with  M′,C′ R1 N′,D′ . We proceed by induction on the
deﬁnition of R1. The reﬂexivity of the relation R1 is clear, except for the clause (iv) in
which it will be treated.
(i) Here we simply use Proposition 3.
(ii) Here, C = D. We proceed by induction on the structure of C.
• C = x := e. If Γ(x) ⊑ b, then we have  M,e  ⇓ n and  N,e  ⇓ n by the
simplesecuritylemmabecauseM =b N.Sothetransition M,C 
τ →l M[x ←
n],skip  is matched by  N,C 
τ →l  N[x ← n],skip . We also have that
M[x ← n] =b N[x ← n] and we stay in clause (ii). If Γ(x) = shigh and
evaluating e in M and N does not yield the same value (which is the interesting
case), we match by the same step, since memories remain equal concerning
their bhigh (or lower) parts.
• C = outputi(e). There are two cases depending on whether i ⊑ l or not. In
the former case, since M =b N  M,e  ⇓ n and  N,e  ⇓ n so the same value
is output. We stay again in clause (ii) because the memories are not modiﬁed.
If i = high, then the transition is silent, and computations stay together since
the memories are not modiﬁed.
• C = if e then C1 else C2.
If ⊢ e : τ with τ ⊑ b, then evaluating e on M or N yields the same value be-
cause M =b N. The transition matching  M,C 
τ →l M,Ci  is thus  N,C 
τ →l
 N,Ci  and we stay in clause (ii).
Now if ⊢ e : s, according to the typing rule, ⊢ Ci : (s,σ,δ)cmd. So, even if the
branching is different depending on whether C is run on M or N, both conﬁg-
urations remain related, since memories are unchanged, and both commands
are shigh (clause (i)).
• C = while e do C′ and C = for e do C′. Here we proceed as in conditional
case.
• C = C1;C2. Depending on which transition rule is used, we have two cases :
1. If C-SEQ1 is used, we hence have  M,C1;C2 
u →l  M′,C′
1;C2  with
 M,C1 
u →l  M′,C′
1 . We distinguish two cases whether C2 is shigh or
not.
(a) If ⊢ C2 : (τ2,σ2,δ2)cmd with τ2 ⊑ b, only rule T-SEQ1 can be
used. Then ⊢ C1 : (τ1,σ1,δ1)cmd with σ1 ⊑ b so C1 does not con-
tain a shigh guard. Using Lemma 7, we have  N,C1 
u →l  N′,C′
1 
with M′ =b N′. Applying rule C-SEQ1 gives that  N,C1;C2 
u →l
 N′,C′
1;C2 . We stay again in clause (ii).
(b) If C2 is shigh. Applying the induction hypothesis on C1 gives that
 N,C1 
u ⇒l  N′,C′′
1  with M′ =b N′ and  M′,C′
1 R1 N′,C′′
1 . We
then obtain by rule C-SEQ1 that  N,C1;C2 
u ⇒l  N′,C′′
1;C2 . We
ﬁnally have that  M′,C′
1;C2 R1 N′,C′′
1;C2  by clause (iii).21
2. If C-SEQ2 is used, then  M,skip;C2 
τ →l  M,C2 . The maching step
is simply  N,skip;C2 
τ →l  N,C2  and the conﬁguration are related by
clause (ii).
(iii) C = C1;C2, D = D1;C2 with  M,C1 R1 N,D1  and C2 is shigh.
1. If C-SEQ1 isused,then M,C1;C2 
u →l M′,C′
1;C2 and M,C1 
u →l M′,C′
1 .
Applying the induction hypothesis on D1 leads to  N,D1 
u ⇒l  N′,D′
1  with
M′ =b N′. We then apply rule C-SEQ1 and stay in clause (iii).
2. If C-SEQ2 is used, then C1 = skip and  M,skip;C2 
τ →l  M,C2 . The
matching move is then  N,D 
τ ⇒l  N,D . We have that  M,C2 R1 N,D 
by clause (iv) because C2 is shigh and  M,skip R1 N,D1 .
(iv) Here, C is shigh, D = D1;D2, with  M,skip R1 N,D1  and D2 is shigh.
1. Suppose we have  M,C 
u →l  M′,C′ . C is shigh, so M =b M′ and u = τ.
The matching step is then  N,D 
τ ⇒l  N,D  and we stay in clause (iv).
2. Suppose now we have  N,D 
u →l  N′,D′ . If rule C-SEQ1 is used, then
 N,D1 
u →l  N′,D′
1  and applying the induction hypothesis on D1 gives us
 M,skip 
u ⇒l  M′,C′′ . The only transition from skip is itself so M′ = M
and C′′ = skip. It gives us also that u = τ. We can thus match the transition
with  M,C 
τ ⇒l  M,C  and we stay in clause (iv).
If rule C-SEQ2 is used, then D1 = skip and  N,D 
u →l  N,D2 . So u = τ.
The matching step is hence again  M,C 
τ ⇒l  M,C  and we conclude using
clause (i) because D2 is shigh.
R1 is a l-TSB. By clause (ii) and Proposition 1, since M =b N implies Ml = Nl
and M|l
b = N|l
b , we have that in a well typed program, there is no ﬂow from shigh
data to bhigh and low data.
The next step is to prove that the type system ensures TINI concerning the bhigh-
data.
We proceed a similar way, providing a l-TIB R2 over conﬁgurations. The relation
R2 is deﬁned:  M,C R2 N,D  if and only if C and D are typable, M =l N, and one
of the following holds:
(i) C and D are bhigh
(ii) C = D
(iii)  M,C R′
2 N,D , the relation R′
2 being deﬁned inductively as follows :
C,D bhigh
 M,C;C′  R′
2  N,D;C′ 
R1
 M,C  R′
2  N,D 
 N,C;C′  R′
2  N,D;C′ 
R2
We now have to prove that R2 is a l-TIB. We will use the property that R2 is pre-
servedbysequentialcomposition,i.e. M,C R2 N,D implies M,C;C′ R2 N,D;C′ .
This result can be easily proved by case analysis on the deﬁnition of the relation. The
relation R2 is clearly symmetric. Suppose we have  M,C R2 N,D . By deﬁnition of
R2, we have that M =l N. Now we have to show that if  M,C 
u →l  M′,C′  then ei-
ther  N,D 
u ⇒l  N′,D′  with  M′,C′ R2 N′,D′  or  N,D ⇑l. We proceed by case
analysis on the deﬁnition of R2.22
(i) Here we simply use Proposition 4.
(ii) C = D. We proceed by induction on the structure of C.
• C = C1;C2. Depending on the semantic rule that is used, we have two cases:
1. C-SEQ1: We have that  M,C1;C2 
u →l M′,C′
1;C2  because  M,C1 
u →l
 M′,C′
1 .ApplyingtheinductionhypothesisonC1, N,C1 
u ⇒l  N′,C′′
1 
with  M,C′
1 R2 N′,C′′
1 . But R2 is preserved by sequential composition,
so  M,C′
1;C2 R2 N′,C′′
1;C2 .
2. C-SEQ2: Here, C1 = skip and  M,C 
τ →l  M,C2 . We simply have
that  N,C 
τ →l  N,C2  and the conﬁgurations stay together thanks to the
clause (ii).
• Other cases are similar to those of the relation R1.
(iii) We proceed by induction on the deﬁnition of R′
2.
• R1: Here, C = C1;C2, D = D1;C2 and C1, D1 are bhigh. Here, only rule
C-SEQ1 can be used, since skip cannot be typed as a bhigh command.
We thus have that  M,C1;C2 
u →l M′,C′
1;C2  because  M,C1 
u →l M′,C′
1 .
But C1 is bhigh, so u = τ, M =l M′ and C′
1 is bhigh. We can match this step
by  N,D1;C2 
τ ⇒l  N,D1;C2 . Conﬁgurations are in the relation by rule R1.
• R2: Note that only rule C-SEQ1 can be used: if C1 = skip, it cannot be
related to D, since R′
2 only relates sequential compositions. Then, we have
that  M,C1;C2 
u →l M′,C′
1;C2  because  M,C1 
u →l M′,C′
1 . But we have
 M,C1  R′
2  N,D1 , so by induction hypothesis on D1 :
∗ If N,D1 
u ⇒l  N′,D′
1 ,wematchusingrule C-SEQ1 by N,D1;C2 
u ⇒l
 N′,D′
1;C2  and we can conclude by rule R2.
∗ If  N,D1 ⇑l then since D1 cannot be skip (from the deﬁnition of R′
2) we
know that  N,D1 
τ →l  N′,D′
1  for some N′, D′
1. By the symmetry of
relation R′
2 and induction hypothesis, we get that  M,C1 
τ ⇒l  M′′,C′′
1 
with  N′,D′
1 R2 M′′,C′′
1  or  M,C1  ⇑l. Thus, by rule C-SEQ1, the
transition we had originally to match is a silent one, and we can match it
by  N,D1;C2 
τ →l  N′,D′
1;C2 . Conﬁgurations stay related by rule R2.
R2 is thus a l-TIB, and by clause (ii) and Proposition 2, we have the TINI property
of well typed programs concerning their bhigh-data: there is no ﬂow from bhigh data
to low data except via the termination channel. 2
5 Correlation Leaks
In this section we mention a weakness in the deﬁnition of secret-sensitive noninterfer-
ence which allows the attacker to observe correlations between big and small secrets.
We show how the deﬁnition can be strengthened to remove such correlations, and con-
jecture that the type system guarantees correlation-freedom without need for modiﬁca-
tion.
Suppose that b is bhigh and s is shigh (in the lattice in Figure 1). Somewhat surpris-
ingly the program outputlow(b == s) is secret-sensitive noninterfering (note though
that it is not typeable). This is because the low observer can say nothing about the value
of e.g. s in isolation. The problem is that although the observer cannot deduce anything23
about the individual kinds of secret, he can deduce information about their correlation
(in this example whether they are equal or not).
To eliminate the possibility of learning something about the correlation of big and
small secrets we need to demand that the knowledge learnt about big and small secrets
together is the same as for the combined knowledge learnt about them independently.
To express this precisely we need some additional notation.
In the deﬁnitions of secret-sensitive noninterference we have dealt with knowledge
as sets of projections of memories. We say that a memory M is full if dom(M) is the
set of all variables. In order to easily compare and combine knowledge sets we need
to work with full memories. Deﬁne M⋆ to be the set of full memories obtainable by
completing M:
M⋆ = {N | N|dom(M) = M,N is full}.
Now lift  ⋆ to sets of memories K in the natural way by deﬁning
K⋆ =
[
M∈K
M⋆
Deﬁnition 13 (Correlation Freedom). A program C is Correlation Free if for all   v ∈
Obsi(C,Mi), we have kbs
i (C,Mi,  v)⋆ = kb
i(C,Mi,  v)⋆ ∩ ks
i(C,Mi,  v)⋆, where
kbs
i (C,Mi,  v) = {M|i | M ∈ ki(C,Mi,  v)} and M|i is the complement of Mi – i.e.,
the projection of M to the variables not visible at level i.
In the case that C is secret-sensitive noninterfering we can show that this condition
isequivalent tokbs
i (C,Mi,  v)⋆ = kb
i(C,Mi,  v)⋆,whichsaysthatnothingmoreislearnt
about the big and small secrets together than can be deduced from the big secrets alone.
Conjecture 1 Well-typed programs are correlation free.
We leave the proof of this conjecture to further work; the intuition here is that any
“correlation information” will always be typed as s-level data, and hence cannot be
leaked at all.
6 Conclusions
In this article we provided a way to reﬁne an arbitrary complex security lattice in order
to distinguish two levels of secret, the big secrets b and the small ones s. Big secrets
can be handled more liberally on the grounds that they can be made sufﬁciently large
and random for slow leakage to be tolerable. We introduced an accompanying notion
of secret-sensitive noninterference which combines the relative merits of termination-
sensitive and termination-insensitive noninterferences. We illustrated the use of the def-
inition in the soundness argument for a simple type system for verifying secret-sensitive
noninterference.24
Related Work As mentioned previously, the starting point of this work is [AHSS08].
Our interpretation of the results there is that we need to treat different kinds of secret in
different ways, and to our knowledge this paper is the ﬁrst to do so in a noninterference
setting. It is, however, relatively common to give a special treatment to cryptographic
keys as compared to other kinds of secret – e.g. [AHS06] – but usually the goal here is
to deal with integrity (a key cannot be modiﬁed using a low value) or freshness (a key
cannot be used more than once).
Our type system is essentially a fusion of a type-based version of Denning’s sys-
tem [VSI96], and a stricter system based on [BC01]. The latter system is stricter than
a Denning-style analysis for quite a different purpose: to deal with multi-threaded pro-
grams. Our system, in a sequential setting, improves on [BC01] by additionally tracking
whether a program is terminating.
FurtherWork Anaturalandinterestingnextstepwouldbetocombinesuchatypesys-
tem with cryptographic primitives (e.g. [Vol00][LV05][AHS06]). The notion of “big”
and“small”secretshaveanaturalinterpretationinthecryptographicsetting,since“big”
secrets correspond to e.g. cryptographic keys. In such a setting it might also be im-
portant to handle “size integrity”, so that one could know that a variable is not only
independent of small secrets, but that it is a big secret.
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